Scientific communities confer many forms of credit -both implicit and explicit -on their successful members, and it has long been argued that the motivation provided by these forms of credit helps to shape a community's collective attention toward different lines of research. The allocation of scientific credit, however, has also been the focus of long-documented pathologies: certain research questions are said to command too much credit, at the expense of other equally important questions; and certain researchers (in a version of Robert Merton's Matthew Effect) seem to receive a disproportionate share of the credit, even when the contributions of others are similar.
INTRODUCTION
As a scientific community makes progress on its research questions, it also develops conventions for allocating credit to its members. Scientific credit comes in many forms; it includes explicit markers such as prizes, appointments to high-status positions, and publication in prestigious venues, but it also builds upon a broader base of informal reputational measures and standing within the community [3, 13, 16] . The mechanisms by which scientific credit is allocated have long been the subject of fascination among scientists, as well as a topic of research for scholars in the philosophy and sociology of science. A common theme in this line of inquiry has been the fundamental ways in which credit seems to be systematically misallocated by scientific communities over time -or at least allocated in ways that seem to violate certain intuitive notions of "fairness." Two categories of misallocation in particular stand out, as follows.
1. Certain research questions receive an "unfair" amount of credit. In other words, a community will often have certain questions on which progress is heavily rewarded, even when there is general agreement that other questions are equally important. Such issues, for example, have been at the heart of recent debates within the theoretical computer science community, focusing on the question of whether conference program committees tend to overvalue progress on questions that display "technical difficulty" [1, 10] .
2. Certain people receive an "unfair" amount of credit. Robert Merton's celebrated formulation of the Matthew Effect asserts, roughly, that if two (or more) scientists independently or jointly discover an important result, then the more famous one receives a disproportionate share of the credit, even if their contributions were equivalent [15, 16] . 1 Other attributes such as affiliations or academic pedigree can play an analogous role in discriminating among researchers.
There is a wide range of potential explanations for these two phenomena, and many are rooted in hypotheses about human cognitive factors: a fascination with "hard" problems or the use of such problems to identify talented problem-solvers in the first case; the effect of famous individuals as focal points or the confidence imparted by endorsement from a famous individual in the second case [15, 24] .
A model of competition and credit in science
One can read this state of affairs as a story of how fundamental human biases lead to inherent unfairness, but we argue in this paper that it is useful to bring into the discussion an alternate interpretation, via a natural formal model for the process by which scientists choose problems and by which credit is allocated.
We begin by adapting a model proposed in influential work of Kitcher in the philosophy of science [12, 13, 23] , and with roots in earlier work of Peirce, Arrow, and Bourdieu [2, 5, 18 ]. Kitcher's model has some slightly complicated features that we do not need for our purposes, so we will focus the discussion in terms of the following closely related model; it is designed as a stylized abstraction of a community of n researchers who each choose independently among a set of m open problems to work on.
• The m open problems will also be referred to as projects.
Each project j has an importance wj (also called its weight), and a probability of success qj (with a corresponding failure probability fj = 1 − qj). We assume these numbers are rational. The researchers will initially be modeled as identical, but we later consider generalizations to individuals with different problem-solving abilities.
• Each researcher must choose a single project to work on. We model researchers as working independently, so if kj researchers work on project j, there is a probability of (1−f k j j ) that at least one of them succeeds.
• In the event that multiple researchers succeed at project j, one of them is chosen uniformly at random to receive an amount of credit equal to the project's importance wj. We can imagine there is a "race" to be the first to solve the problem, and the credit goes to the "winner" ; alternately, we get the same model if we imagine that all successful researchers divide the credit equally.
Suppose that researchers are motivated by the amount of credit they receive: each researcher chooses a project to work on to maximize her expected amount of credit, given the choices of all other researchers. The selection of projects is thus a game, in which the players are the researchers, the strategies are the choices of projects, and the payoffs are the expected amount of credit received. This game-theoretic view forms the basis of Kitcher's model of scientific competition; the view itself was perhaps first articulated explicitly in this form by the social scientist Pierre Bourdieu [3, 5] , who wrote that researchers' motivations are organized by reference to -conscious or unconsciousanticipation of the average chances of profit ... Thus researchers' tendency [is] to concentrate on those problems regarded as the most important ones ... The intense competition which is then triggered off is likely to bring about a fall in average rates of symbolic profit, and hence the departure of a fraction of researchers towards other objects which are less prestigious but around which the competition is less intense, so that they offer profits of at least as great.
Like the frameworks of Bourdieu and Kitcher, our model is a highly simplified version of the actual process of selecting research projects and competing for credit. We are focusing on projects that can be represented as problems to be solved; we are not modeling the process of collaboration among researchers, the ways in which problems build on each other, or the ways in which new problems arise; and we are not trying to capture the multiple ways in which one can measure the importance or difficulty of a problem. These are all interesting extensions, but our point is to identify a tractable model that contains the fundamental ingredients in our discussion: a competition for credit among projects of varying difficulty, in a way that causes credit-seeking individuals to distribute themselves across different projects. We will see how phenomena that are complex but intuitively familiar can arise even when a community has a single, universally agreed-upon measure of importance and difficulty across projects.
Credit as a mechanism for allocating effort
Our main focus is to extend this class of models to consider the issues raised at the outset of the paper, and in particular to the two sources of "unfairness" discussed there. The model we have described thus far is based on an intuitively fair allocation of credit that does not suffer from either of these two pathologies: all researchers are treated identically, and the credit a successful researcher receives is equal to the community's agreed-upon measure of the importance of the problem solved. In other words, no problems are overvalued relative to their true importance, and no researchers are a priori favored in the assignment of credit.
As a first thought experiment, suppose that we were allowed to design the rules by which credit was assigned in a research community; are these "fair" rules the ones we should use? The following very small example shows the difficulties we quickly run into.
Suppose, for simplicity, that we are dealing with a community consisting of two players a and b, and two projects x and y. Project x is more important and also easier; it has wx = 1 and qx = 1/2. Project y is less important and more difficult; it has wy = 9/10 and qy = 1/3. Figure 1(a) shows the unique Nash equilibrium for this research community: both players work on x, each receiving an expected payoff 3/8 (since project x will be solved with probability 3/4, and a and b are equally likely to receive credit for it.)
If we were in charge of this research community, arguably the natural objective function for us to care about would be the social welfare, defined as the total expected importance of all projects successfully completed. And now here's the difficulty: the unique Nash equilibrium does not maximize social welfare. It produces a social welfare of 3/4, whereas if the players divided up over the two different projects, we would obtain a social welfare of 1/2 + 3/10 = 4/5.
Can we change the way credit is assigned so as to create incentives for the players under which the resulting Nash equilibrium maximizes social welfare? In fact, there are two natural ways to do this, and each should be recognizable given the discussion at the beginning of the introduction.
First, we could declare that the credit received for succeeding at a project will not be proportional to its importance. Instead, in our example, we could decide that success at the harder project y will bring an amount of credit equal to w y = wy. If 9/5 > w y > 9/8, then the unique Nash equilibrium is socially optimal (Figure 1(b) ).
Alternately we could declare that if players a and b both succeed at the same project, they will not split the credit equally, but instead in a ratio of c to 1. (Equivalently, if they both succeed, player a is selected to receive all the credit with probability c/(c + 1) and player b with probability 1/(c + 1).) If c > 4, then it is not worth it for b to try competing with a on project x, and b will instead work on project y, again leading to a socially optimal Nash equilibrium ( Figure 1(c) ).
This example highlights several points. First, we can think of the amount of credit associated with different projects as something malleable; by choosing to have certain projects confer more credit, the community can create incentives that cause effort to be allocated in different ways. Second, it is clearly the case that actual research communities engage in this shaping of credit, not just at an implicit level but through a variety of explicit mechanisms: the decisions of program committees and editorial boards about which papers to accept, the decisions of hiring committees about which people to interview and areas to recruit in, and the decisions of granting agencies about funding priorities all serve to shift the amounts of credit assigned to different kinds of activities. In this sense, a research community is, to a certain extent, a kind of "planned economy" -it is much more complex than our simple model, but many of its central institutions have the effect of deliberately implementing and publicizing decisions about the allocation of credit for different kinds of research topics.
What we see in the example is that the "fair" allocation of credit can be at odds with the goal of social optimality: if the community believes that as a whole it is being evaluated according to the total expected weight of successful projects, then by rewarding its participants according to these same weights, it produces a socially sub-optimal outcome. The two alternate ways of assigning credit above correspond to the two forms of "unfairness" discussed at the outset: overvaluing certain projects (in our example, the harder and less important project), and overvaluing the contributions of certain researchers. If done appropriately in this example, either of these can be used to achieve social optimality.
As a final point on the underlying motivation, we are not claiming that research communities are overtly trying to assign credit in a way that achieves social optimality, or arriving at credit allocations in general through explicit computation. It is clear that the human cognitive biases discussed earlier -in favor of certain topics and certain people -are a large and likely dominant contributor to this. What we do see, however, is that social optimality plays an important and surprisingly subtle role in the discussion about these issues: institutions such as program committees and funding agencies do take into account the goal of shaping the kind of research that gets done, and to the extent that these cognitive biases can sometimes -paradoxically -raise the overall productivity of the community, it arguably makes such biases particularly hard to eliminate from people's behavior.
Social optimality and misallocation of credit: General results
Our main results begin by establishing that the two kinds of mechanisms suggested by the example in Figure 1 are each sufficient to ensure social optimality in general -that is, in all instances. For any set of projects, it is possible to assign each project j a modified weight w j , potentially different from its real weight wj, so that when players receive credit according to these modified weights, all Nash equilibria are socially optimal with respect to the real weights. It is also possible to assign each player i a weight zi so that when players divide credit on successful projects in proportion to their weights zi, all Nash equilibria are again socially optimal. This makes precise the sense in which our two categories of credit misallocation can both be used to optimize social welfare.
These results in fact hold in a generalization of the basic model, in which the players are heterogeneous and have different levels of ability at solving problems. In this more general model, a player's success at a project depends on both her ability and the project's difficulty: each player i has a parameter pi ≤ 1 such that her probability of succeeding at project j is equal to the product piqj. Beyond this, the remaining aspects of the model remain the same; in particular, if multiple players all succeed at the same project, then one is selected uniformly at random to receive the credit. (That is, their ability affects their chance of succeeding, but not their share of the credit.) For this more general game, there still always exist re-weightings of projects and also re-weightings of credit shares to players that lead to socially optimal Nash equilibria.
Our results make use of the fact that the underlying game, even in its more general form with heterogeneous players, is both a congestion game [17, 19] and a monotone valid-utility game [9, 25, 26] . However, given the motivating setting for our analysis, we have the ability to modify certain parameters of the game -as part of a research community's mechanism for allocating credit -that are not normally under the control of the modeler. As a result, our focus is on somewhat different questions, motivated by these credit allocation schemes. At the same time, there are interesting analogies to issues in congestion games from other settings. Re-weighting the amount of credit on projects can be viewed as a kind of "toll" system, interpreting the effort of the researchers as the "traffic" in the congestion game. The crux of our analysis for re-weighting the players is to begin by considering an alternate model in which an ordering is defined on the players, and the first player in this ordering to succeed receives all the credit. This suggests interesting potential connections with the theory of priority algorithms introduced by Borodin et al. [4] ; although the context is quite different, we too are asking whether there is a "greedy ordering" that leads to optimality. A related set of questions was considered by Strevens in his model of sequential progress on a research problem, working within Kitcher's model of scientific competition [23] .
We also consider some of the structural aspects of the underlying game; among other results, we show that the price of anarchy of the game is always strictly less than 2 (compared with a general upper bound of 2, which can sometimes be attained, for fully general monotone valid-utility games). For the case of identical players, we also show that the ratio of the price of anarchy to the price of stability (i.e. the welfare of the best Nash equilibrium relative to the worst) is at most 3/2. In particular, this implies that when there exists a Nash equilibrium that is optimal, there is no Nash equilibrium that is less than 2/3 times optimal.
Finally, we consider a still more general model, in which player success probabilities are arbitrary and unrelated: player i has a probability pij of succeeding on project j. We show that there exist instances of this general game in which no re-weighting of the projects yields a social optimal Nash equilibrium. However we do not rule out the possibility that there exists a re-weighting of the players that yields a socially optimal Nash equilibrium.
Interpreting the model
With any simple theoretical model of a social process -in this case, credit among researchers -it is important to ask whether the overall behavior of the model captures fundamental qualitative aspects of the real system's behavior. In this case we argue that it captures several important phenomena at a broad level. First, it is based on the idea that institutions within a research community can and do shift the amount of credit that different research topics receive, and in a number of cases with the goal of creating corresponding incentives toward certain research directions. Second, it argues that some of the typical ways in which credit is misallocated can interact in a complex fashion with social welfare, and that these misallocations can in fact play an important role in the maximization of welfare.
Moreover, there is a rapidly widening scope for the potential application of explicitly computational approaches to credit-allocation, as we see an increasing number of intentionally designed systems aimed at fostering massive Internet based-collaboration -these include large open-source projects, collaborative knowledge resources like Wikipedia, and collective problem-solving experiments such as the Polymath project [11] . For example, a number of creditallocation conventions familiar from the scientific community have been built into Wikipedia, including the ways in which editors compete to have articles "featured" on the front page of the site [22] , and the ways in which they go through internal review and promotion processes to achieve greater levels of status and responsibility [6, 14] . While the framework in this paper is only an initial foray in this direction, the general issue of designing credit-allocation schemes to optimize collective productivity becomes an increasingly wide-ranging question.
There are also potential connections to work in an area termed the economics of science, which studies the allocation of resources by organizations across different research projects [3, 21] , in the context of activities such as R&D (e.g. [7] ). While the central issues in these models are somewhat different, connecting them more closely to the questions raised here is an interesting question. Finally, the model offers a set of simple and, in the end, intuitively natural interpretations for the specific ways in which misallocation can lead to greater collective productivity. The re-weighting of projects not only follows the informal roadmap contained in Pierre Bourdieu's quote above, but sharpens it. Even without reweighting of projects, the effect of competition does work to disperse some number of researchers out to harder and/or less attractive projects, which helps push the system toward states of higher social welfare. But the point is that this dispersion is not optimally balanced on its own; it needs to be helped along, and this is where the re-weighting of projects comes into play. The re-weighting of players is based on a different point -that when certain individuals are unfairly marginalized by a community, it can force them to embark on higher-risk courses of action, enabling beneficial innovation that would otherwise not have happened. In all these cases, it does not mean that such forms of misallocation are fair to the participants in the community, only that they can sometimes have the effect of increasing the community's overall output.
IDENTICAL PLAYERS
We first consider the case of the Project Game defined in the introduction when all players are identical, and then move on to the case in which players have different levels of ability. Recall that wj denotes the weight (i.e. importance) of project j, and fj denotes the probability that any individual player fails to succeed at it. Thus, when there are k players working on project j, the contribution of project j to the social welfare is wj(1 − f k j ), and we denote this quantity by σj(k).
We denote the choices of all players by a strategy vector a, in which player i chooses to work on project ai. As is standard, we denote by a−i the strategy vector a without the i th coordinate and by j, a−i the strategy vector a1, . . . , ai−1, j, ai+1, . . . , an. We use Kj( a) to denote the set of players working on project j in strategy vector a, and we write kj( a) = |Kj( a)|. The social welfare obtained from strategy vector a is u( a) = j∈M σj(kj( a)). Since each of the players working on the project is equally likely to receive the credit, the payoff, or utility, of player i under strategy
We make a few observations about these quantities. First, as noted in the introduction, ui( a) is the utility of i regardless of whether we interpret the credit as being assigned uniformly at random to one successful player on a project, or divided evenly over all successful players. Moreover, since the players divide up the social welfare among themselves, we have i∈N ui( a) = u( a). Since a player's utility depends solely on the number of other players choosing her project, it is not hard to verify that the game with identical players is a congestion game, and hence has pure Nash equilibria. Finally, it will be useful in some of the proofs to define the marginal utility rj(k) from joining project j when k players are already working on it; this is rj(k)
We begin by developing some basic properties of the social optimum and of the set of Nash equilibria with identical players; we then build on this to prove bounds on the price of anarchy (the ratio of the social welfare of the social optimum to the worst Nash equilibrium) and the price of stability (the analogous ratio of the social optimum to the best Nash equilibrium). After this, we provide algorithms for re-weighting projects and re-weighting players so as to produce Nash equilibria that are socially optimal.
Before proceeding, we first state three basic claims about the game with identical players. The simple proofs are included in the full paper. CLAIM 2.1. The Project Game with Identical Players is a monotone valid-utility game. CLAIM 2.2. The social optimum can be achieved by the following greedy algorithm: players are assigned to projects one at a time, and in each iteration an assigned player is placed on a project j with the greatest current marginal utility rj(kj).
The following claim was also proved in [8] in the context of a related class of congestion games. CLAIM 2.3. A Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time by the following algorithm: players choose projects one at a time in an arbitrary order, and in each iteration the current player i chooses a project that maximizes her utility in respect to the choices made by earlier players.
We now prove that with identical players, any two Nash equilibria are very similar in their assignment of players to projects 2 :
CLAIM
The Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability
From Claim 2.1, by a result of Vetta [26] , it follows that the price of anarchy (P oA) of the game is at most 2. Here we provide a strengthened analysis of the price of anarchy that yields several consequences: (i) a bound of 1 + c−1 c on the P oA for instances in which the worst Nash equilibrium has at most c players assigned to any single project; (ii) as a corollary of (i), a general upper bound of 2 − 1 n on the P oA for any instance; and (iii) a bound of 3 2 between the price of anarchy and the price of stability (P oS) for any instance. None of (i)-(iii) hold for monotone valid-utility games in general.
We first show that these bounds are tight, by means of the following example. Consider an instance with n players and n projects; all projects are guaranteed to succeed (i.e. qj = 1 for all j); and the weights of the projects are defined so that w1 = 1 and wj = 1/n for j > 1. The socially optimal assignment of players to projects in this game is for each player to work on a different project, yielding a social welfare of 2 − 1 n . On the other hand, it is a Nash equilibrium for every player to work on project 1, yielding a social welfare of 1. Furthermore, in the case of this example when n = 2, the social optimum is also a Nash equilibrium, establishing a gap of 3/2 between the P oA and P oS in this case. (We also note that for general n, if we increase the weight of project 1 by arbitrarily little, then we obtain an example in which the P oS is arbitrarily close to 2 − 
The following is a useful claim based on Roughgarden's paper: CLAIM 2.6. If a monotone valid-utility game is (λ, µ)-smooth then for every Nash equilibrium a and every strategy vector b, we
. Applying this bound with a equal to the worst Nash equilibrium and b equal to the optimal assignment, it follows that the price of anarchy is at most 1 + µ λ .
In the full paper, we prove a sequence of claims about the smoothness of the Project Game with identical players, leading up to the following result. THEOREM 2.7. The Project Game with Identical Players is (λ, µ)-smooth for λ = 1 and
Consequences (i) and (ii) above follow directly from Theorem 2.7 together with Claim 2.6.
To obtain consequence (iii), we call a game weakly-(λ, µ)-smooth provided the (λ, µ)-smoothness condition holds just for all Nash equilibria a and b, rather than all arbitrary strategy vectors. Now, for any two Nash equilibria a and b, Claim 2.4 implies that the number of players working on each project in a and b can differ by at most one. Hence, by Theorem 2.7 we have that the Project Game with Identical Players is weakly-(λ, µ)-smooth for µ = . We can now apply Claim 2.6 with a equal to the worst Nash equilibrium and b equal to the best Nash equilibria to get that u( b) u( a) ≤ 3 2 .
Re-weighting Projects to Achieve Social Optimality
We now describe a mechanism for re-weighting projects so as to achieve social optimality. As discussed in the introduction, we show that it is possible to assign new weights {w j } to the projects so that when utilities are allocated according to these new weights, all Nash equilibria are socially optimal. Note that the re-weighting of projects only affects players' utilities, not the social welfare, as the latter is still computed using the true weights {wj}.
The idea is to choose weights so that when players are assigned according to the social optimum, they all receive identical utilities. The following re-weighting accomplishes this: we compute a socially optimal assignment o, and define w j = kj( o)
for kj( o) > 0 and w j = 0 otherwise. THEOREM 2.8. With these weights, all Nash equilibria achieve the social welfare of assignment o.
PROOF. We first show that o is a Nash equilibrium with these weights. Denote the utility of each player in o by x: that is, for every player i, we have ui( o) = x. We also have that for every project j = oi ui(j, o−i) < x. This holds for each j because either kj( o) = 0, in which case w j = 0, or else kj( o) > 0, in which case there are already players assigned to j, and for such projects j a player's utility function is strictly decreasing in the number of players working on j. Therefore, o is a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore we also show that all Nash equilibria assign to every project j exactly kj( o) players. As a corollary of the proof of Claim 2.4 we have that if there exist Nash equilibria o and a assigning different numbers of players to some project, then there exists a player i such that oi = ai and ui(oi, o−i) = ui(ai, o−i). But this is impossible since we have that ui(oi, o−i) = x and ui(ai, o−i) < x.
It is interesting to reflect on the qualitative interpretation of these new weights for an instance with n players and a very large set of projects of equal weight and with success probabilities q1 ≥ q2 ≥ q3 ≥ · · · decreasing to 0. In this case, there will be a largest j * for which the optimal assignment places any players on j * , and computational experiments with several natural distributions of {qj} indicate that the number of players assigned to projects increases roughly monotonically toward a maximum approximately near j * . This means that the credit assigned to projects must increase toward j * , and then be chosen so as to discourage players from working on projects beyond j * . Moreover, the value of j * grows with n, the number of players. Hence we have a situation in which the research community can be viewed, roughly, as establishing the following coarse division of its projects into three categories: "too easy" (receiving relatively little credit), "just right" (near j * , receiving an amount of credit that encourages extensive competition on these projects), and "too hard" (beyond j * , receiving an amount of credit designed to dissuade effort on these projects). Moreover, smaller research communities reward easier problems (since j * is smaller), while larger communities focus their rewards on harder problems.
Re-weighting Players to Achieve Social Optimality
We now discuss the companion to the previous analysis: a mechanism for re-weighting the players to achieve social optimality. Recall that this means we assign each player i a weight zi, and when a set S of players succeeds at a project j, we choose player i ∈ S to receive the credit wj with probability zi
When players are identical, we can base the re-weighting mechanism on the optimality of the greedy algorithm expressed in Claim 2.2. That is, if we were to assign an absolute order to the players, and announce the convention that credit would go to the first player in the order to succeed at a project, then the players' simultaneous choices would simulate the greedy algorithm to achieve social optimality: the first player in the announced order would choose a project without regard to the choices of other players; the second player would choose as though the first player would win any direct competition, but without regard to the choices of any other players; and so forth. Now, instead of an order, we need to define weights on the players; but we can approximately simulate the order using sharply decreasing weights in which zi = i for an > 0 chosen to be sufficiently small. The effect of these sharply decreasing weights is to ensure that a player i gets almost no utility from a project j if a player of higher weight also succeeds at j, and i gets almost all the utility from j if i is the player of highest weight to succeed at j. From this, we can show that each player's utility is roughly what it would be under an order on the players. In the full paper we prove that we can indeed find such an as required. THEOREM 2.9. With > 0 sufficiently small and the re-weighting of players defined by zi = i , all Nash equilibria of the resulting game are socially optimal.
Even given the informal argument above, the proof is complicated by the fact that, with positive weights on all players, their strategic reasoning is more complex than it would be under an actual ordering. To prove Theorem 2.9, we consider the relationship between the actual utilities of the re-weighted players for a given strategy vector a, denoted ui( a), and their "ideal" utility under the order we are trying to simulate, denoted ui( a) -the utility function defined by having the first player in order to succeed at a project receive all the credit. Recalling that the projects' weights and success probabilities are rational, let d be their common denominator. We first show that if these two different utilities are close enough with respect to d, then our approximate simulation of the an order using weights will succeed: CLAIM 2.10. If for every player i and project j we have ui(j, a−i)− 1 4d n+1 ≤ ui(j, a−i) ≤ ui(j, a−i) + 1 4d n+1 , then any Nash equilibrium in the game with the weights {zi} is also an optimal assignment.
PROOF. The proof resembles the proof that the greedy algorithm achieves the socially optimal assignment. Let a be a Nash equilibrium in the game with the weights {zi}. Among all possible optimal assignments, we say that an optimal assignment o is most similar to a if for every two projects j and l such that kj( o) > kj( a) and
). This is a most similar assignment to a since we cannot create a more similar assignment with the same utility by moving a player from one project to another.
Let o be most similar to a, and assume towards a contradiction that a is not an optimal assignment. Hence there exist two projects j and l such that:
For those two projects, since o is an optimal assignment, rj(kj( o)− 1) > r l (k l ( o)). By the previous statement and the decreasing property of rj we conclude that also rj(kj( a)) > r l (k l ( a) − 1). Let player i be the player with the minimal weight working on project l; we have ui(l, a−i) = r l (k l ( a) − 1). Since a is a Nash equilibrium we have that ui(l, a−i) ≥ ui(j, a−i). By the assumption stated in the claim, we have
But this is a contradiction: each of rj(kj( a)) and r l (k l ( a) − 1) are products of at most n + 1 terms of common denominator d, and they are not equal, so they must differ by at least 1 d n+1 .
We then prove, in the full paper, that it is possible to choose sufficiently small that the bounds in Claim 2.10 will hold: CLAIM 2.11. There exists an such that for every player i and
PLAYERS OF HETEROGENEOUS ABILITIES
We now consider the case in which players have different levels of ability. Recall from the introduction that in this model, each player i has a parameter pi ≤ 1, and her probability of success at project j is piqj. As before, player i receives credit for her selected project ai if she succeeds at it and is chosen, uniformly at random, from among all players who succeed at it. Player i's utility is the expected amount of credit she receives in this process.
To begin with, we can show the following basic facts about this general version of the game. CLAIM 3.1. The Project Game with Different Abilities is a monotone valid-utility game. The proof of Claim 3.1 is very similar to the proof of Claim 2.1; the only part that changes in a non-trivial way is the proof that the utility function is submodular, and we include a proof of this fact in the full paper. We also prove Claims 3.2 and 3.3 in the full paper. Note that Claim 3.2 is less clear-cut than in the case of identical players, since now the payoffs depend not just on the number of players sharing a project but on their identities. To bypass this we prove that the utility functions for the Project Game with Different Abilities obey a certain structural property that, by results of Monderer and Shapley [17] , implies that the game is a congestion game.
There is a useful closed-form way to write i's utility, as follows. First, suppose that in strategy vector a, player i selects project j, and let S denote the other players who select j. Then in order for i to receive the credit of wj for the project, she has to succeed (with probability piqj); moreover, some subset S of the other players on j will succeed (with probability h∈S p h qj) while the rest will fail (with probability h∈{S−S } (1 − p h qj)), and i must be selected from among the successful players (with probability 1 |S | + 1
). Thus we have
This summation over all sets S is a natural quantity that is useful to define separately for future use; we denote it by cj(S) and refer to it as the competition function for project j. The competition function represents the expected reduction in credit to a player on project j due to the competition from players in the set S; instead of the expected credit of wjpiqj that i would receive if she worked on j in isolation, she gets wjpiqjcj(S) when the players in S are also working on j. Thus, with ai denoting the project chosen by i, and Ka i ( a) denoting the set of all players choosing project ai, we have ui( a) = wa i piqa i ca i (Ka i ( a) − i).
Re-weighting Projects to Achieve Social Optimality
We now describe how to re-weight projects, creating new weights {w j }, so as to make a given social optimum o a Nash equilibrium. First, since the relative values of the project weights are all that matters, we can choose any project x arbitrarily and set its new weight w x equal to 1. We will set the weights w j of the other projects so that every player's favorite alternate project (and hence the target of any potential deviation) is x. Now, among all the players working on another project j = x, which one has the greatest incentive to move to x? It is the player i ∈ Kj( o) with the lowest ability pi, since all players i ∈ Kj( o) experience the same competition function cx(Kx( o)), but i experiences the strongest competition from the other players in Kj( o). This is because they all have ability at least as great as i, so i has the most to gain by moving off j.
Motivated by this, for a strategy vector a and a project j, we define δj( a) to be the player i ∈ Kj( a) of minimum ability pi. We define w x = 1 and for every other project j = x, we define
THEOREM 3.4. The optimal assignment o is a Nash equilibrium in the game with the given weights {w j }.
PROOF. To prove this, we will show that if a player did want to move to another project, she would choose to move to project x. After establishing this, it is enough to show that all the players working on project x in the optimal assignment do not want to move to another project, and that the rest of the players do not want to move to project x.
Before proceeding with these arguments, however, we state and prove a technical lemma giving an inductive form for the competition function that will be useful in the subsequent arguments.
For the sake of brevity we define: DEFINITION 3.5.
I(S , S)
LEMMA 3.6. For any project j, set of players S, and player h / ∈ S, we have
We now show that a player i working on a project other than x views x as her best alternate project. LEMMA 3.7. For any player i such that oi = x, and for every project, j = oi, we have ui(x, o−i) ≥ ui(j, o−i) PROOF. We need to show that w x piqxcx(Kx( o)) ≥ w j piqjcj(Kj( o)). By setting the weights to their values according to Formula (1), we get that:
By rearranging the terms we have that:
Intuitively, this inequality follows from the fact that as more players work on a project, it is less likely that a specific player will be the one to succeed at it. Formally, it follows from Lemma 3.6 above.
Finally, we show that players on project x do not want to leave x, and players not on x do not want to move to x (and hence, by Lemma 3.7, do not want to move anywhere else either).
LEMMA 3.8.
1. All players who are working in the optimal assignment on project x do not want to move to a different project.
2. All players who are working in the optimal assignment on project different than x do not want to move to project x.
PROOF. Assume towards a contradiction that there exists a player i who prefers to work on project j = oi. This means that
For each of the cases we set w o i and w j to their values according to Formula (1) and get to a contradiction by rearranging the terms.
1. We set w o i = 1 and
and get the following inequality:
After rearranging the inequality we get that:
The contradiction follows by noticing that cx(Kx( o) − i) > cx(Kx( o)) by Lemma 3.6; however, by the same lemma we also have that cj(Kj( o)) < cj(Kj( o) − δj( o)) 2. We set
and w j = 1 and get the following inequality:
By Lemma 3.6 we have that as p h is greater the amount we subtract from c(S) is greater. Therefore since by definition pi ≥ p δo i ( o) , we have
and this is a contradiction.
Since this establishes that all players want to stay with their current projects, it follows that o is a Nash equilibrium under the modified weights, and hence the proof of Theorem 3.4 is complete.
Re-weighting Players to Achieve Social Optimality
It is also possible to re-weight the players so as to make the social optimum a Nash equilibrium. Because the greedy algorithm no longer computes the social optimum, it is no longer enough to use weights to approximately simulate an arbitrary ordering on the players. However, we can use an extension of this plan that incorporates two additional ingredients: first, we base the greedy ordering on the socially optimal assignment, and second, we do not use a strict ordering but rather one that groups the players into stages of equal weight. The algorithm for assigning weights is as follows. In the beginning, we fix an optimal assignment o and a sufficiently small value of > 0 (to be determined below), and we declare all players to be unassigned. The algorithm then operates in a sequence of stages c = 1, 2, . . .. At the start of stage c, some players have been given weights and been assigned to projects, resulting in a partial strategy vector a c consisting only of players assigned before stage c. We show that at the start of stage c, each unassigned player would maximize her payoff by choosing a project from the set
Thus in stage c, the algorithm does the following. It first computes this set of projects Xc. Then, for each project j ∈ Xc for which there exists a player i such that oi = j and i is unassigned, it assigns i to project j, and sets zi = c . It would be natural to try proving that with these weights, the assignment o is a Nash equilibrium. However, this is not necessarily correct. In the final stage c * of the algorithm, it may be that the number of unassigned players is less than |Xc * |, and in this case some of the unassigned players might go to projects other than the ones corresponding to o. However we show that the following defined assignment o , which is derived from o, is both an optimal assignment and a Nash equilibrium with these weights. DEFINITION 3.9. Assignment o is constructed as follows:
• For every player i that was not assigned in the last stage of the algorithm, we define o i = oi.
• For every project j ∈ Xc * we compute the value
where z * is the weight defined for players that were assigned last and I(S, Kj( o )) = l∈S p l qj l∈K j ( o )−S (1−p l qj).
• We sort all the projects in Xc * by their value for wjcj( o ).
• We assign each unassigned player to one of the top projects in Xc * according to the sorting.
THEOREM 3.10. The previously defined assignment o is an optimal assignment and a Nash equilibrium in the game with weights {zi}.
PROOF. The following claim shows that o is indeed an optimal assignment: CLAIM 3.11. o is an optimal assignment (i.e., u( o ) = u( o)).
PROOF. By the construction of o the only players that might not work on the same project as in o are those that were assigned last. All these players are assigned to projects in Xc * . Notice that all projects in Xc * maximize wj {l∈K j ( a c * −1 )} (1−p l qj)qj. Hence, the contribution of the players assigned last is the same regardless of which specific project in Xc * they are working on. Therefore o is an optimal assignment.
Next, we show that o is a Nash equilibrium in the game with weights {zi}. The proof resembles the proof of Theorem 2.9. As in Theorem 2.9, the actual utilities of the re-weighted players for a given strategy vector a are denoted by ui( a), and their "ideal" utilities under the partial order we are trying to simulate are denoted ui( a):
where previ(Ka i ( a)) is the set of players working on project ai which are strictly before player i in the order.
Recalling that the projects' weights and success probabilities are rational, let d be their common denominator of all the terms in the sets {wj : j ∈ M } and {piqj : i ∈ N, j ∈ M }. CLAIM 3.12. If for every player i and project j such that the weight of player i is unique among players working on project j:
then o is a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. Assume towards a contradiction that o is not a Nash equilibrium. Thus, there exists a player i and a project j = o i such that ui(j, o −i ) > ui( o ). By the weighting algorithm we have that ui( o ) ≥ ui(j, o −i ). To see this, assume player i was assigned in stage c. If c < c * , then o i = oi and oi was one of the projects maximizing the marginal contribution to social welfare; if c = c * , then by the definition of o, the project o i must have been one of the projects maximizing this marginal contribution. So in either case we have
By multiplying both sides with pi we have that ui( o ) ≥ ui(j, o −i ). Therefore we are left with two cases to consider:
This means that player i was assigned at a different stage than all the players working on project j were. Hence, player i has a unique weight on project j. Since every player always has a unique weight on the project she is allocated to by using the assumption of the claim, we get that:
This implies that ui( o ) − ui(j, o −i ) < 1 2d n+1 . But by the definition of d, since ui( o ) and ui(j, o −i ) are not equal, they must differ by at least 1 d n+1 , a contradiction.
2. ui( o ) = ui(j, o −i ): Let c be the stage in which player i was assigned. The fact that ui( o ) = ui(j, o −i ) implies that j ∈ Xc. For c < c * , by applying the following two lemmas, which we prove in the full version, we conclude that ui(j, o−i) ≤ ui( o). LEMMA 3.13. In every stage c < c * of the algorithm, for every project j ∈ Xc there exists an unassigned player i such that oi = j. LEMMA 3.14. For every two players i and l that have the same weight, ui(o l , o−i) ≤ ui( o).
For c = c * by the construction of o player i can only improve her utility by switching to one of the "top" projects in Xc * . On each of these projects there is already a player working with the same weight as player i. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 3.14 to conclude that ui(j, o−i) ≤ ui( o).
The final step of the proof consists of showing that one can choose sufficiently small that the bounds in Claim 3.12 will hold. The proof is very similar to the corresponding proof for identical players. In the full version of the paper we provide further details, as well as further discussion of the similarity between the two proofs.
A FURTHER GENERALIZATION: ARBI-TRARY SUCCESS PROBABILITIES
Finally, we consider a further generalization of the model, in which player i has an arbitrary success probability pij when working on project j. The strategies and payoffs remain the same as before, subject to this modification. Also, this generalization is a monotone valid-utility game and congestion game; however, we omit the proofs since they are very similar to the proofs for the case from the previous section.
An interesting feature of this generalization is that one can no longer always make the social optimum a Nash equilibrium by reweighting projects. To see why, consider an example in which there are two players 1 and 2, and two projects a and b. We have wa = w b = 1 and success probabilities p1a = 1, p 1b = 0.5, p2a = 0.5, and p 2b = 0.1. Now, the social optimum is achieved if player 1 is assigned to a and player 2 is assigned to b. But this gives too little utility to player 2, and in order to keep player 2 on b, we need to re-weight the projects so that w b ≥ 2.5w a . In this case, however, player 1 also has an incentive to move to b, proving that no re-weighting can enforce the social optimum.
The case of re-weighting players is an open question. In Sections 2 and 3, we used the re-weighting of players in a limited way, to simulate an ordering. It is possible that a similar tactic can also be used in the general model -that is, there may always exist a partial ordering on the players yielding a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. If this is not the case, one can potentially make use of weights on the players in more complex ways, and so we have the following open questions. (a) For every instance, does there exist a partial ordering on the players (or a re-weighting of the players) so that there is a social optimum that is a Nash equilibrium? If not, can this be done by re-weighting both the players and the projects? (b) Does there exist a constant c < 2 such that for all instances, it is possible to re-weight only the projects so that the price of anarchy is at most c?
As one interesting partial result on the re-weighting of players in this model, we can show the following. THEOREM 4.2. If there exists a social optimum o that assigns each player to a distinct project, then it is possible to re-weight the players so that o is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof, given in the full paper, uses an analysis of the alternatingcycle structure of a bipartite graph on players and projects, combined with ideas from the proof of Theorem 3.10.
Finally, as a further insight into the structure of this general case, we pursue an analogy with the bound of 2 − 1 n on the price of anarchy in the case of identical players: we show that even in the case of arbitrary success probabilities, the price of anarchy is strictly better than the general bound for monotone valid-utility games implies. THEOREM 4.3. In every instance of the Project Game with arbitrary success probabilities, the price of anarchy is strictly less than 2.
